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CHALLENGING THE CHALLENGE: TWELVE YEARS AFTER
BATSON, COURTS ARE STILL STRUGGLING TO FILL IN THE
GAPS LEFT BY THE SUPREME COURT
I. INTRODUCTION

The client is an Arabian terrorist, and his attorney wants to
strike all Jews from the jury. The client is an accused rapist, and his
attorney intends to eliminate all women from the jury. The client is
OJ. Simpson, and his attorneys hope to seat as many AfricanAmerican jurors as possible.
Every attorney seeks to select a jury that will favor the client. I
Many attorneys believe that a case can be won or lost during the
jury selection stage of the triaI.2 Therefore, considerable amounts of
time and money may be spent on efforts to shape the jury.3 Both
sides will use every weapon available.
The peremptory challenge-the elimination of a potential jury
member without cause4-is one of the most powerful weapons an
'1.

2.

3.

4.

See Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Rnles of the
Jury, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1041, 1088-89 n.188 (1995)(noting that, although the purpose of voir dire is to seat an impartial jury, "in practice" each side is looking
for a sympathetic decision-maker).
See Robert B. Hirshorn & Heather R. Epstein, How to Conduct a Meaningful &
Effective Voir Dire in Criminal Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 659, 68~1 (1992) (explaining that a good trial attorney puts "as much energy into the selection of a
jury as he or she does in the presentation of the case, because he or she realizes that he or she can put on the best play in the world, but without an audience that is receptive to the play, it will be misunderstood and not comprehended").
See Jim Goodwin, Articulating the Inarticulable: Relying on Nonverbal Behavioral
Cues to Deception to Strike Jurors During Voir Dire, 38 ARIz, L. REv. 739, 739-40
(1996) (indicating that an entire industry, composed of "sociologists, market
researchers, and communications experts," exists to help the attorney select a
jury); Debra Sahler, Scientifically Selecting Jurors While Maintaining Professional Responsibility: A Proposed Model Rule, 6 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 383, 386 (1996) (observing that the use of trial consultants is no longer limited to multi-million
dollar cases).
See BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990) (defining peremptory challenge as "the right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required
to assign, a reason for the challenge"). But see, e.g., ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN
SONSTENG. ADvOCACY: JURY TRIALS § 1.61, at 57 (1994) (maintaining that, although no reason need be given, an attorney may not strike a juror based on
race or some other protected class).
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attorney can use during the jury selection process. 5 The primary
goal of the peremptory challenge is to eliminate all prospective jurors who appear partial to the other side. 6 The peremptory challenge allows an attorney to dismiss those venirepersons without providing a reason.1 However, the unrestrained use of peremptory
challenges was curtailed by the Supreme Court in Batson v.
Kentucky.8
This Comment discusses the struggle to fill the gaps left by the
Batson decision. Part II provides background information regarding
the jury selection process,9 peremptory challenges,1O and the Equal
Protection Clause. I I Part III provides an overview of the decisions
leading up to Batson,12 followed by a discussion of Batson and its
progeny.13 The procedures and remedies formulated in Batson are
analyzed generally in Part IY.I4 Part V reviews the Batson procedures
and remedies as Maryland courts apply them. 15 Part VI discusses the
present standing of peremptory challenges and makes recommendations for their future use in the jury selection process. 16 This Comment concludes that despite a lack of direction, the Batson challenge is a necessary tool to eliminate discrimination in the jury
selection process. 17

5.

See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYsTEM AND 1HE IDEAL OF DEMOC-

131 (1994) (explaining that peremptory challenges allow attorneys on
both sides to rid a jury of biased or prejudiced people).
See HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 11.4.3, at 457-58 (2d ed.
1993).
See VALERIE O. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING 1HE JURY 67 (1986) (noting that
attorneys who believe jurors will view their side disfavorably use their preemptory strikes to eliminate such jurors when they are not dismissed for cause).
476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause is violated
when a prospective juror is excluded because of race). Prior to Batson, prosecutors were able to exclude jurors who shared the defendant's race without
any constitutional limitations. See Cynthia Richers-Rowland, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HAsTINGS LJ. 1195, 1195
(1987).
See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text. See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74-100 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 101-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 183-264 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 265-342 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 343-58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 359-73 and accompanying text.
RACY

6.

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Jury Selection Process
The selection of a jury is a multi-step process intended to comport with the requirements of the Constitution and the American
judicial system. 18 It involves the creation of a source list from which
prospective jurors will be drawn, the voir dire questioning of prospective jurors,19 the elimination of biased jurors through challenges
for cause,20 and the elimination of other objectionable jurors
through peremptory challenges. 21 The first step is the selection of a
pool of prospective jurors from a source list. 22 At the federal district
court level, prospective jurors may be selected from voter registration lists or from lists of actual voters within the district or division. 23 In addition to voter lists, other sources of names may be
used24 to ensure a random selection from "a fair cross section of
See, e.g., Juli Vyverberg, Note, The Peremptory Challenge: Substance Worth Preserving?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 435, 437-38 (1994) (" 'It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be truly
representative of the community.' " (quoting Smith v.. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130
(1940»). Although the Constitution does not require that the jury be perfectly representative of the surrounding community, it does forbid the systematic exclusion of" 'distinctive groups in the community.' " [d. (quoting Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (1975». According to at least one commentator, ajury comprised of a representative cross section of the community "is an
essential component of the Sixth Amendment." [d. at 437 (citing Taylor, 419
U.S. at 528); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing all criminal defendants the right to an "impartial jury"). It is through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment that the Sixth Amendment applies to the States.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (extending the protections
of the Sixth Amendment).
19. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 3940 and accompanying text.
21. For a comprehensive discussion of peremptory challenges, see infra notes 4157 and accompanying text.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(a)-(b) (1994) (providing that the clerk shall maintain a
jury wheel and from time to time as required, publicly draw names of persons
to be assigned to jury panels).
23. See id. § 1863(a),(b)(2) (providing that each federal district court shall devise
a plan for random jury selection that shall, among other things, specify
whether the names of jurors shall be selected from voter registration lists).
24. See id. § 1863(b)(2) (providing that if necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 and 1862, other sources may
be used, including the city directory in the District of Columbia and the resident list in the district of Massachusetts).
18.
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the community,"25 and to prevent exclusion on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status. "26
The majority of states follow the federal approach and use state
voter lists as a source for pooling prospective jurors. 27 Other states
use alternative sources in addition to or in lieu of voter lists. 28 These
alternative sources include "a local census, the tax rolls, city directories, telephone books, and drivers' license lists."29 A minority of
states follow the key-man system. 30 The key-man system authorizes
political and civic leaders to suggest prospective jurors. 31
The next step in the jury selection process is the voir dire questioning of prospective jurors. During voir dire, the prospective jurors are questioned to determine their biases. 32 The federal system
provides two methods for questioning jurors. 33 Thus, on the federal
level, the court will either conduct the voir dire itself or will allow
the parties or attorneys to question the jurors. 34 The manner in
25.

[d. § 1861 (setting forth the policy of the United States that all litigants shall
have the right to a jury selected at random).
26. [d. § 1862 ("No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States ... on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.").
27. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 963 (2d ed.
1992) (noting that lists of voters are the most commonly used method). Maryland adheres to the federal approach. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. '& JUD. PROC. §
8-202(2) (1998) (providing that the jury selection plan shall specify procedures for the jury commissioner to select names from "voter registration lists
or from other sources as are necessary").
28. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 963.
29. [d.
30. See id. (approximating that one-third of the states, all of which are located in
New England and the South, use the key-man system).
31. See id. Some commentators have argued the key-man system should be invalidated because its subjectivity "invites abuse" and "invidious manipulation." See
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 184 (1997) (concluding that the
Supreme Court should invalidate the key-man system due to its subjectivity
and expense).
32. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 2.10, at 48 (explaining that under the
voir dire process, jurors are challenged to establish a fair and impartial jury).
33. See id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (discussing voir dire rules in criminal
cases); FED. R. Cw. P. 47(a) (discussing voir dire rules in civil cases).
34. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 2.10, at 48 (noting that when the
court does the questioning, the court must permit attorneys to supplement
the inquiry by such additional questions "as it deems proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or
their attorneys as it deems proper") (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a); FED. R.
Cw. P. 47(a)).
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which voir dire is conducted in state courts varies from state to
state. 35 The attorneys rely on voir dire responses to determine
whether or not to strike the juror. 36
The last two steps in the jury selection process involve the elimination of jurors through challenges. 37 There are two primary types
of challenges-a challenge for cause and a peremptory challenge. 38
A challenge for cause is directed at a prospective juror who is objectionable for a particular reason. 39 1'0 establish a challenge for cause,
the attorney must show that the juror's sympathies or prejudices are
such that it would be impossible for that juror to be impartial. 40
When the attorney wishes to remove a juror, but is unable to establish a challenge for cause, the peremptory challenge is often used. 41
B.

The Use and Importance oj Peremptory Challenges

The peremptory challenge is the direct opposite of a challenge
for cause. 42 The peremptory challenge allows each party to eliminate prospective jurors from the jury panel without establishing
35.

36.

37.
38.

39.

40.

41.
42.

See id. The authors note that (1) in approximately 13 states, the examination
is done by the judge only, (2) it is done primarily by attorneys in 18 states,
and (3) the responsibility is shared by judge and attorney in the remainder.
See id. Maryland follows the federal approach permitting either the parties or .
their attorneys to conduct the questioning, or permitting the court to question the jurors itself. See MD. R CIv. P. 2-512(d) ("[T]he court may permit the
parties to conduct an examination of jurors or may itself conduct the exami. nation after considering questions proposed by the parties."); MD. R CRIM. P.
4-312(d).
See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 2.10, at 51 (providing that after jurors
have been examined, the parties can exercise peremptory and for cause challenges).
SP.e id..
See id. § 2.11, at 51. A third type of challenge, a challenge to the array, is used
when a party alleges that there was an irregularity in summoning or selecting
the jury. See id. In Maryland, a challenge to the array is expressly recognized.
See MD. R CN. P. 2-512 (a); MD. R CRIM. P. 4-312(a).
See HAYDOCK & SoN5rENG, supra note 4, § 1.53, at 48. A challenge for cause
may be based on actual bias, which is present when the prospective juror formulates an opinion regarding the case, the parties, or the witnesses at voir
dire. See id. at 48-49. A challenge for cause may also be based on implied bias,
which is present when the juror has an existing relationship with any of the
attorneys, parties, or witnesses. See id. at 49.
See id. § 1.54, at 49 (explaining that a mere statement by a juror that he or
she is biased or prejudiced is not enough to establish cause to strike, but that
the jurors' answers must indicate an inability to be impartial).
See Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1197.
See HAYDOCK & SONsrENG, supra note 4, § 1.53, at 48, § 1.61, at 57.
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cause. 43 Unlike a challenge for cause, the peremptory challenge
does not require the court's approval. 44 Exercise of the peremptory
challenge is solely the prerogative of the attorney4s-no reason or
explanation for striking the prospective juror is required. 46 The
strike can be based solely on the attorney's hunch or intuitive belief
that the prospective juror is unlikely to render a favorable verdict. 47
The peremptory challenge performs the valuable function of
increasing the parties' power to choose who will sit in judgment
over them. 48 Some believe that skillful exercise of the peremptory
challenge will help the attorney select a more impartial jury.49
Others view it as a tool to manipulate the outcome of a trial. so A
challenge for cause involves the difficult tasks of identifYing juror
bias and proving that bias to the judge.51 These difficulties are eased
by the peremptory challenge because the attorney is allowed to remove a potentially biased juror without establishing cause. S2
Much of the potential for abuse is explained by the very limited information upon which attorneys exercise their strikes. s3 An at43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

50.

51.
52.
53.

See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 131.

See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMIT·
MENT TO REPRESENTATNE PANELS 145 (1977).
See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 67.
See HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 4, § 1.61, at 57; see also Kirk Pittard, Withstanding Batson Muster: What Constitutes a Neutral Explanation?, 50 BAYLOR L.
REv. 985, 985 (1998) ("The peremptory practice allows litigants to strike potential jurors for reasons based purely on instinct and intuition, reasons which
may not be amenable to articulation." (citing Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860,
867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992»).
See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 76 (questioning the effectiveness of attorneys in their attempts to create a favorable jury).
See id. at 72 (noting that the defendant's ability to strike jurors that appear biased may help the defendant accept the verdict as reasonable).
See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 131 ("In theory, peremptories are justified as
tools for fashioning impartial juries, used by both sides to eliminate 'extremes
of impartiality.' ").
See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 73 (noting that several manuals advise
lawyers to "[llook for jurors whose minds can be molded, who will not resist
your arguments, and who are not expert in the matters of the current case").
See id.
See id.
See id. This information is typically limited to the juror's name, occupation,
and physical characteristics. See id. An informal telephone survey of jury commissioner offices in Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Anne Arundel
County indicates that the information given to Maryland attorneys includes
the juror's name, occupation, spouse's occupation, and level of education. See
MD. R. Civ. P. 2-512(c); MD. R CRIM. P. 4-312(c).
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torney's decision to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror may
rest on a remark made during voir dire, a questionable glance, or
the juror's clothing. 54 Likewise, some have noted patterns by prosecutors to strike prospective jurors who share the same genetic,
socio-economic, religious, or national background as the defendant. 55 Trial experts have gone so far as to advise young lawyers to
base their selections on stereotypes. 56 This advice is grounded on
implied assumptions that jurors are "incapable of doing justice
across group lines, that jurors always favor their own kind. "57

C. Equal Protection and the Jury Selection Process
The Supreme Court has increasingly relied on the Equal Protection Clause58 to ensure that all individuals are treated fairly in
the exercise of their rights. 59 The Equal Protection Clause applies to
government actions that classifY individuals for different treatment
under the law. 60 An equal protection analysis examines whether the
54.
55.

56.
57.

58.

59.

60.

See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 131-32.
See id. at 132 (noting that the success of this tactic relies on the presumption
that jurors will favor parties that resemble them). Many also believe that a juror's demographic and socio-economic characteristics will influence that juror's verdict in a particular case. See id. at 143.
See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 73 (discussing the types of jurors favored
and disfavored by trial tactic manuals).
ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 131-32. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98
(1984) (concluding that if prosecutors are allowed to exercise peremptory
challenges based on the assumption that African-American jurors would automatically favor defendants of their race, the Equal Protection Clause " 'would
be but a vain and illusory requirement' ") (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587, 598 (1935»; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, j., dissenting) (commenting that a person's race "is unrelated to
his fitness as a juror").
The Equal Protection Clause provides: No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.1, at 5 (2d ed. 1992). The right to fair or
equal treatment requires that the government "treat each individual with
equal regard as a person." LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
§ 16-1. at 1438 (2d ed. 1988).
See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 59, § 18.1, at 4 ("The equal protection'
guarantee ... governs all governmental actions which classify individuals for
different benefits or burdens under the law."). Equal treatment may be denied when a government classification distinguishes between persons who
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government classification is based on impermissible criteria or
places an arbitrary burden on a particular group.61 In some instances, the express requirements of the law will establish a questionable government classification. 62 In other instances, the law will
not establish a questionable classification by its own terms, but it
will be applied in an impermissible manner.63
When the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause are at issue, the Supreme Court examines the constitutionality of government classifications using three standards of review. 64 The first standard of review for an equal protection analysis is the rational
relationship test. 65 Under the rational relationship test, the Supreme
Court limits its analysis to whether the government classification has
a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. 66 The Su-

61'.

62.

63.

64.
65.
66.

should be viewed as "similarly situated." TRIBE, supra note 59, § 18.1, at 1438.
Equal treatment may also be denied when the government fails to establish a
classification for persons who should be viewed as "differently situated." Id.
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.2, at 7; see also Joseph S. Jackson,
Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 24 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 407, 456 (1997) (explaining that the legislature cannot draw
classifications to disadvantage or burden a group); James J. Sing, Integration As
a 1wo-Way Street, 108 YALE LJ. 479, 480-81 (1998) (discussing the impermissibility of a government standard that "burdens or grants preferential treatment"
to certain groups).
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.2, at 8; see also Therese M. Goldsmith, Note, Hopwood v. Texas: The Fifth Circuit Further Limits Affirmative Action
Educational Opportunities, 56 MD. L. REv. 273, 281-82 (1997) (providing that
overt race-based classifications "must be viewed with skepticism") (citing
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 u.S. 200, 226-27 (1995»; Lisa White
Shirley, Reassessing the Right of Equal Access to the Political Process: The Hunter
Doctrine, Affirmative Action, and Proposition 209, 73 TuL. L. REv. 1415, 1422
(1999) (describing racial classifications as an overt distinction based on race).
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.2, at 8 ("[AJ law may have no
impermissible classification by its own terms but it may be applied in such a
way as to create a classification."); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the
Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, 1,1uality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical
Analysis of "Neutral Theory" and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'y 243, 284 n.46 (1999) (pointing out that the legislature may pass a
law without intending to discriminate or may not realize that a statute will
burden a particular group); Shirley, supra note 62, at 1422 (discussing that a
facially neutral law may nonetheless have a disproportionate impact on minority groups).
See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 14.
See id.
See id.; see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
("The general rule is that legislation is presumed valid and will be sustained if
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preme Court has applied the rational relationship test to government classifications that stem from social and economic legislation. 67
The second standard of review is the strict scrutiny test. Under
the strict scrutiny test, the Supreme Court raises the level of its review and independently determines whether the government classification is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. 68 The Supreme Court has applied the strict scrutiny test to
two types of classifications: (1) classifications that affect a person's
ability to exercise a fundamental constitutional right69 and (2) classi-

67.

68.

69.

the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest."); see also Kathleen A. Graves, Comment, Affirmative Action in Law
School Admissions: An Analysis of Why Affirmative Action is No Longer the Answer . .. Or is It?, 23 S. ILL U. LJ. 149, 166 (1998); Julie M. Riewe, Note, The
Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,47 DUKE LJ. 117, 127 (1997) (pointing out that a
law will be upheld if it passes the rational relationship test and if it does not
burden a fundamental right or target a suspect class); Jerald W. Rogers, Note,
Romer v. Evans: Heightened Scrutiny Has Found a Rational Basis-Is the Court Tacitly Recognizing Quasi-Supsect Status for Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals?, 45 U. KAN.
L. REv. 953, 957-58 (1997).
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (observing that the Equal Protection Clause allows states wide latitude on social and economic legislation); see also Graves,
supra note 66, at 574 (arguing that a rational basis review gives legislatures
deference in instituting social policy); Helen Herschkoff, Positive Rights and
State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REv.
1131, 1153 (1999) (discussing the rational relation test in the context of welfare legislation); Peter J. Longo, The Human Genome Project's Threat to the
Human Constitution: Protections From Nebraska Constitutionalism, 33 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 3, 9 (1999) (" [I]f a statute involves economic or social legislation not implicating a fundamental right or suspect class, courts will only ask whether
[there is] a rational relationship [to a legitimate government interest].").
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 15; see also Kevin F. Clarkson
et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's Choice on the Last Frontier, 16
ALAsKA L. REv. 213, 249 (1999) (discussing the types of cases to which the
strict scrutiny test applies); Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer, When Silence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and Neglect, 49
DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 73 (1999) (discussing the application of the strict scrutiny
test to religious freedom cases); Linda N. Deitch, Comment, Breaking News:
Proposing a Pooling Requirement For Media Coverage of Live Hostage Students, 47
UCLA L. REv. 243, 298 (1999) (arguing that a content-based ban on speech
would have to pass a strict scrutiny test).
See Susan R. Klein & Katherine P. Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions and Compound Criminal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REv. 333, 386 (1998); Gretchen Witte, Comment, Internet Indecency and Impressionable Minds, 44 VILL. L.
REv. 745, 777 (1999) (arguing that a restriction on children's Internet access
involves two fundamental rights-parental child rearing authority and free-
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fications that make distinctions using a "suspect" basis. 70
The third standard of review is the intermediate test, which is a
middle ground between the strict scrutiny test and the rational relationship test. 71 Under the intermediate test, or heightened scrutiny
standard of review, the government classification must have a substantial relationship to an important government interest. 72 The Supreme Court has used the intermediate test for classifications involving gender and illegitimacy.73

70.

71.

72.

73.

dom of speech-and must therefore withstand strict scrutiny).
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 15. According to the Court,
"[t]he general rule gives way" when the government uses suspect classifications such as "race, alienage, or national origin." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. For
a description of the general rule, see supra note 66. See also Darlene C. Goring, Affirmative Action and the First Amendment: The Attainment of a Diverse Student Body is a Permissible Exercise of Institutional Autonomy, 47 U. KAN. L. REv.
591, 596 (1999) (noting that classifications that are considered suspect are
usually race based); Brian Privor, Dusk Til Daum: Childrrn's Rights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfw Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REv. 451, 492 (1999) (arguing
age is not a suspect class) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976»; Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An
Economic Inquiry Into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. LJ.
1787, 1814-21 (1992) (discussing suspect classes).
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 17 ("The Supreme Court
has adopted an intermediate standard of review that is not as difficult for the
government to meet as the compelling interest test, but which involves far less
deference to the legislature than does the rationality test.").
See id.; see also John P. Cronan, Subjecting the Fourth Amendment to Intermediate
Scrutiny: The Reasonableness of Media Ride-Altmgs, 17 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 949,
959 (1999) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny would be the appropriate test
in addressing Fourth Amendment issues surrounding media "ride-alongs" with
law enforcement agents); Stacy Sulman Kahana, Crossing the Border of Plenary
Power: The Viability of an Equal Protection Challenge to Title VI of the Welfare Law,
48 DUKE LJ. 305, 339 (1997) (predicting the outcome of a welfare law challenge under each Equal Protection test); Yanet Perez, Note, Women Win the
War at VMI, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 233, 234 (1997) (discussing the application
of the strict scrutiny test to gender-based classifications).
See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 17. In Cleburne, the Supreme
Court determined that mental retardation was not a classification that required more than the rationally related standard of review. See Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 44042. But see Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Pr0spective Jurors with Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 ALB.
L. REv. 289, 34243 (1993) (arguing that Batson should be extended to include
classifications based on physical disabilities).
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III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A. fu-Batson Cases
Generally, courts do not subject a law to any level of equal protection analysis unless a party demonstrates that the law classifies
persons in some manner, including on the basis of race, alienage,
national origin, gender, or illegitimacy.74 Historically, discrimination
on the basis of race and gender has permeated the jury selection
process. 75 The promise of a non-discriminatory process began over
100 years ago. 76 In 1879, the Supreme Court examined discrimination in the jury selection process in Strauder v. West Virginia. 77 The
Strauder Court invalidated a state statute that solely permitted "white
male persons who are twenty-one years of age" to serve as jurors.7~
Addressing the issue of whether a "colored man" could be fairly
tried by a jury assembled with a discriminatory selection process,79
the Court held that jury selection criteria discriminating against a
group because of its color or race violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. so
According to the Strauder Court, the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to "assure to the colored race the enjoyment of
all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white per74.
75.

76.
77.
78.
79.

80.

See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.4, at 41.
See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and,Race Discrimination: The Lost
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REv. 140 I, 1406-07 (1983) (discussing the history of racial discrimination in the jury selection process); ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 112-13 (discussing the historical discrimination
against women as potential jurors).
See Schmidt, supra note 75, at 1414 (referring to Strauder as a "lost promise"
and providing a detailed discussion of its "strength and impotence").
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
See id. at 305.
See id. at 305-06. Here, an Mrican-American man was indicted and convicted
of murder by a jury solely comprised of white men. See id. at 305. The Court
carefully defined the issue it was to address:
It is to be observed that the first of these questions is not whether a
colored man, when an indictment has been preferred against him,
has a right to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part
of persons of his own race or color, but it is whether, in the composition or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all
persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because
of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man
sit upon the jury.
[d.
See id. at 310.
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sons. "81 The West Virginia statute effectively impeded the parity that
the Equal Protection Clause sought to secure by denying a race the
right to participate in the administration of justice. 82
A general proposition in Equal Protection jurisprudence is that
a violation is established only upon a "showing of intentional or deliberate discrimination."83 It is easy to find intentional discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause when the state announces its racial exclusion, as the West Virginia legislature did in
Strauder. 84 However, proving intentional discrimination is more difficult when there is no express policy either on the statute's face or
in the government's application. 85 In the years following Strauder,
the Supreme Court struggled with this problem. 86 Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court tended to defer to the judgment of state courts
and rarely overturned convictions of defendants making jury dis-

Id. at 306.
See id. at 308. The Court observed:
It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every
white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his
own race or color,or, rather, selected without discrimination against
his color, and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by the
law with the former.
Id. at 309.
83. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 22.2(c), at 964. As declared by the Court:
The mere fact of inequality in the number selected does not in itself
show discrimination. A purpose to discriminate must be present
which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of
the proscribed race or by unequal application of the law to such an
extent as to show intentional discrimination.
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945).
84. See KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 171.
85. See id. (noting the "huge volume of litigation" generated to determine the existence of purposeful discrimination where the government policy does not
e'xpressly discriminate). See also JOHN G. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14.4, at 621 (5th ed. 1995). A discriminatory classification
for equal protection purposes can be established in one of three ways. First,
the law may establish a classification "on its face," meaning that "the law by
its own terms classifies persons for different treatment." Id. Second, a law may
be challenged in its "application" -while imposing no classification explicitly
on its face, the law may be administered in "different degrees of severity to
different groups of persons who are described by some suspect trait." Id. Finally, while containing no classification and being applied evenhandedly, a
"law may be challenged as in reality constituting a device designed to impose
different burdens on different classes of persons." [d.
86. See KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 175-76.
81.
82.
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crimination claims.87
Although Strauder involved a discriminatory statute rather than
a discriminatory practice,88 it constituted the Supreme Court's foundation for eliminating discrimination in the jury selection process. 89
In 1965, the Supreme Court first addressed the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama. 90 However, the Swain
Court failed to adopt a viable means of protecting the defendant's
right to a fair and impartial jury, free from unscrupulous manipulation by state prosecutors. 91

Swain involved an Mrican-American's conviction and sentence·
to death by an all-white jury.92 The defendant, Robert Swain, objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate
Mrican-Americans from the jury.93 The Supreme Court held that
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.

92.

93.

See id. at 175 (characterizing the Supreme Court's deference as "unwarranted"). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's 1880 through 1909 deci- ..
sions in which defendants failed to establish the requisite discriminatory intent, see ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 108-09. For a typical example of the
Supreme Court's deference to state court fact-finding during this period, see
Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 281 (1909). The Thomas Court explained:
"[W] hether such discrimination was practiced in this case was a question of
fact, and the determination of that question adversely to plaintiff in error by
the trial court and by the [Texas] Court of Criminal Appeals was decisive." [d.
at 282; see also Vyverberg, supra note 18, at 443 ("A particular problem with a
trial court's acceptance of subjective demeanor is that it often insulates discriminatory challenges from appellate review. Reviewing courts cannot observe
the idiosyncratic behavior and body language of venirepersons, and thus, may.
often unintentionally ignore illegitimate justifications given by prosecutors. ").
See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965).
See id. at 222-23. In fact, the Court adopted a presumption that a prosecutor's
use .of peremptory challenges secured a fair and impartial jury. See id. at 222.
Further, a showing that "all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they
were removed because they were Negroes" did not overcome this presumption. [d.
See id. at 203. Robert Swain, a 19 year-old African-American, was convicted of
raping a 17 year-old white girl. See id. at 231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Only
Justice Goldberg's dissent elucidated these facts. See id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 209-10 (noting that all six African-Americans were struck from the ..
jury pool). In the county of the trial, three jury commissioners placed "all
male citizens in the community over 21 who are reputed to be honest, intelligent men and are esteemed for their integrity, good character and sound
judgment" on the jury roll. [d. at 206 (citation omitted). The identities of
these individuals were attained from sources including "city directories, registration lists, club and church lists, conversations with other persons in the
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the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor systematically
used peremptory challenges to discriminate over a period of time. 94
Without a clear showing of when, how often, and the relative circumstances of the prosecutor's discriminatory conduct, the defendant would be unable to attack the prosecutor's use of peremptory
strikes. 95 Otherwise, the Court concluded, the long-lasting system of
peremptory challenges would be undermined. 96
Legal scholars have criticized Swain for establishing an insurmountable evidentiary standard. 97 Writing for the Supreme Court
years later in Batson, Justice Powell recognized that a number of
lower courts had interpreted the Swain standard to mean that the
defendant must provide proof of the repeated exclusion of a minority group over several trials. 98 Unfortunately, in the years following
the Swain decision, few defendants were able to uncover sufficient
details regarding a prosecutor's past jury panels and strikes to establish systematic discrimination. 99 Therefore, it was virtually impossible

94.

95.

96.
97.
98.
99.

community, both white and colored, and personal and business acquaintances.» Id. (footnote omitted). Although the Court recognized that the jury
selection process was haphazard and made little effort to include the AfricanAmerican community, it concluded that "an imperfect system is not
equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on race." Id. at 209 (footnote
omitted).
See id. at 227-28 (emphasizing that both prosecutors and defense counsel exercise peremptory strikes). According to the Court, "[t]he ordinary exercise of
challenges by defense counsel does not . . . imply purposeful discrimination
by state officials.» Id. at 227. Therefore, unless the defendant sufficiently established the prosecutor's participation, the mere absence of AfricanAmericans serving as jurors over a particular period of time would not "give
rise to the inference of systematic discrimination on the part of the State.» Id.
The Court eventually discarded the notion that discriminatory peremptory
strikes by a criminal defendant would not constitute state action. See Georgia
v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51-55 (1992). For a discussion of McCollum, see infra
notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
See Swain, 380 U.S. at 224 (finding no evidence of prolonged use of race-based
peremptory strikes on the record). However, it should be noted that AfricanAmericans constituted 26% of Talladega County, yet typically accounted for
no more than 15% of the venire. See id. at 205. Additionally, no AfricanAmerican had served on a jury for fifteen years, even though an average of
six or seven African-Americans were on individual petit jury venires in criminal cases during this time. See id.
See id. at 221.
See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 134; KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 196.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986). Justice Powell referred to the
Swain evidentiary standard as "a crippling burden of proof. HId.
See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 22.3(d), at 979. Most courts did not keep
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for a defendant to successfully attack discriminatory peremptory
challenges. 100
B.

The Batson Decision

Two decades after Swain, the Supreme Court lowered the evidentiary standard established by the Swain Court in the landmark
decision of Batson v. Kentucky.101 James Kirkland Batson, an MricanAmerican defendant, was convicted of second-degree burglary and
receipt of stolen goods by an all-white jury.102 During the jury selection process, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to
eliminate all four Mrican-Americans from the pool. 103 Before the
jury was sworn, the defense attorney moved to discharge the jury,
contending that the prosecutor had improperly removed MricanAmerican venirepersons. I04 Observing "that the parties were entitled
to use their peremptory challenges to 'strike anybody they want
to,' " the trial court denied the motion. 105
The Batson prosecutor's peremptory challenges of potential jurors reflected the perception that Mrican-Americans were incapable
of impartiality in an action against a defendant of the same race. 106
The Supreme Court declared that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited peremptory challenges exercised on this assumption. I07
Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further pro-

100.

101.
102.
103.

104.

105.
106.

107.

records reflecting the race of the prospective jurors, which party challenged a
particular juror, or whether the challenge was made for cause or peremptorily. See Charles j. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatury Use of Peremptury Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1102 (1994).
See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 134 (observing that no federal court made a
finding of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges during the two decades following Swain).
.
.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See id. at 82-83.
See id. at 83. Under Kentucky law, the prosecutor had six peremptory challenges in total. See id. at 83 n.2.
See id. The defense attorney argued that the prosecutor's unexplained removal
of African-American jurors violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. See id.
Id.
This is the assumption courts make regarding the attorney's motives when a
peremptory challenge raises the inference of discriminatory intent. See id. at
101 (White, j., concurring).
See id. at 97 ("The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that
their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless
were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of [the assumption
that African-Americans would be biased toward other African-Americans,
which arises] solely from race.").
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ceedings to determine whether the facts established purposeful discrimination. l08 The Supreme Court further stated that in the absence of a neutral explanation for th:e peremptory challenges, the
defendant's conviction must be reversed. IOO Although the Court did
not expressly rely on any of the three standards used in an equal
protection analysis, I \0 the logical conclusion is that the constitutional protection of suspect classifications, which are subject to strict
scrutiny, will supersede the right to exercise peremptory
challenges. III
The Court's holding in Batson allows a defendant to establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination solely on the basis of
peremptory challenges exercised in the defendant's trial, rather
than requiring a demonstration of systematic exclusion over several
trials. 112 After Batson, a prosecutor's actions and statements during
voir dire and in the exercise of peremptory challenges could be
used to infer a discriminatory purpose.11 3 Once the attorney opposing the challenge makes a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the attorney making the challenge would have to provide a neutral explanation for striking the juror. 114
Rather than concentrating exclusively on the rights of the
defendant, the Batson Court also discussed the impact of discriminatory peremptory challenges on the surrounding community as a
whole. ll5 As noted by the Batson Court, "[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant
and the exCluded juror to touch the entire community."1l6 Aside
from the threats to the defendant's Equal Protection rights, the
Court recognized the considerable threat that discriminatory peremptory strikes pose to the public's confidence in the justice
system. ll7

108. See id.

109. See id.
110. For a discussion of equal protection, see supra notes 58-73 and accompanying
text.
Ill. See Lynch, supra note 73, at 322-23.
112. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.

lB. See id.
114. See ill. at 98.
liS. See ill. at 87.
1I6. Id.
1I7. See id.
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C. Post-Batson Cases

The Supreme Court's decision in Batson has substantially impacted the exercise of peremptory challenges. The peremptory challenge is no longer a true challenge without cause. When an attorney believes that opposing counsel has stricken a prospective juror
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the attorney may make
a Batson challenge-a motion challenging the removal of the juror. 1I8 Moreover, the Supreme Court has extended the reach of the
Batson challenge in subsequent cases. 1I9 Decisions have been made
regarding the use of the Batson challenge by white defendants, 120
civil litigants,121 and prosecutors.1 22 Peremptory challenges on the
basis of gender have also undergone examination by the Court. 123

1. The Evolution of Batson Challenges
a.

Use by White Defendants

In 1991, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
white defendant had standing to object to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes of Mrican-American jurors in Powers v. Ohio.124 A white
defendant, Larry Joe Powers, was convicted of murder and attempted murder. 125 During voir dire, Powers objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove seven MricanAmerican venirepersons. 126 However, there was no indication that
race was a factor in the crime or the trial. I27 The trial court rejected
each of the defendant's challenges without requiring the prosecutor
118. See HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 4, § 1.62, at 59 (explaining that a party
may challenge a peremptory strike exercised by an opposing party if the juror
was struck on an unconstitutional basis).
119. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1103 (observing that the Court has allowed the
use of the Batson challenge when the defendant and juror are not of the
same race, during jury selection in civil actions, and where the objection is
made by the government).
120. See infra notes 12446 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
124. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
125. See id. at 403. He received a sentence of 53 years to life imprisonment. See id.
126. See id. (commenting that each time the State used a peremptory strike to remove an Mrican-American juror, the defendant would make a Batson challenge). In all, the prosecutor exercised 10 peremptory strikes. See id.
127. See id. (recognizing that the record did not reveal whether race was in some
way implicated in the crime or trial).
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to provide a neutral explanation. 128
Again discussing the importance of the jury process to the community at large, much like in Batson,129 the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant did not have to be the same race as the
excluded juror to make a Batson challenge. 13o The Court emphasized the contribution of jury service to community acceptance of
legal institutions and the law, declaring that "with the exception of
voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their
most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process. "131 Although conceding that no individual juror has the right
to sit on a particular jury, the Court emphasized that all citizens
have the right to not be excluded solely on the basis of race. 132
The Court further explained that the defendant had standing
to raise a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. 133 Although the
use of race-based peremptory strikes violates the rights of prospective jurors, the Court held that defendants-even though they are
third parties-may challenge these discriminatory practices. 134 The
Court noted that the similarity in interests between the defendant
and the stricken juror, as well as the potential impact on the administration of justice during the trial, supports the defendant's right to
enforce the rights of jurors. 135 The Court also relied on the practical
roadblocks to equal protection challenges by venirepersons,136 compounded by "little incentive to set in motion the arduous process
needed to vindicate [their] own rights."137
Thus, Powers allows the defendant to enforce the equal protection rights of the excluded juror. 138 The Court also concluded that
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

133.
134.
135.

136.

137.
138.

See id.
See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
[d. at 407.
See id. at 409 ("Race cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence."). The Court also rejected the State's argument that race-based peremptory challenges survived equal protection analysis because they equally affected all races, including whites. See id. at 410. The Court concluded that this
approach "has no place in our modern equal protection jurisprudence." [d.
See id. at 415.
See id. at 413.
See id. at 413-15.
See id. at 415 ("There exists considerable practical barriers to suit by the excluded juror because of the small financial stake involved and the economic
burdens of litigation.").
[d. at 415 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953».
See id.

1999]

Twelve Years After Batson

397

race was irrelevant to the defendant's standing. 139 According to the
Powers Court: "To bar [Powers's] claim because his race differs from
that of the excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury service."I40 This signified an expansion of the Batson decision, which
had previously appeared to require that the defendant share the
same race as the excluded juror. 141
h. . Use by Civil Litigants

To further preserve the integrity of the courtroom, the Supreme Court extended Batson challenges to civil litigants in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete CO.142 Here, Edmonson filed a negligence suit
against his employer for injuries sustained in a work-related accident. 143 When Leesville used peremptory challenges to remove two
African-American jurors, Edmonson requested a race-neutral explanation for the challenges. l44 The trial court denied the request, indicating that Batson only applied to criminal cases. 145
Prior to Edmonson, most charges of discrimination in the jury
selection process involved the actions of prosecutors and other state
officials in criminal cases. l46 This was mainly because of Batson's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause, which is limited to challenging state action. 147 In Edmonson, however, not only did the Court
consider whether civil litigants could exercise racially motivated peremptory challenges,148 but the court also confronted the question of
whether a civil litigant could be considered a government actor so
as to satisfy the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 149
139. See id.
140. [d.
141. See id. at 420 (Scalia, j., dissenting).

142. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
at 616.
at 616-17. The plaintiff was also an Mrican-American. See id.
at 617.
at 618. The Court rejected the notion that it would allow discrimination
in civil cases. See id.
147. See id. at 619.
148. See id. (" [D] iscrimination on the basis of race in selecting a jury in a civil proceeding harms the excluded juror no less than discrimination in a criminal
trial.") .
149. See id. State action refers to an activity that is dominated by governmental authority to the extent that it becomes subject to constitutional constraints. See
id. at 620-22. The state action analysis is used to determine whether the constitutional violation results from a state authorized right and whether the party
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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The Court determined that the mere availability of peremptory
challenges constituted sufficient state action to invoke the Equal
Protection Clause. ISO For this determination, the Court noted that
peremptory challenges were only permitted when authorized by the
government. lSI Without this governmental approval, the private litigant would be unable to strike a juror on a discriminatory or any
other basis. ls2 The Court further reasoned that the jury selection
process, which includes the peremptory challenge system, is administered by the government. IS3 When civil litigants participate in the
jury selection process, they assist the government in the important
function of determining who will be the trier of fact.ls4 The Court
also commented on the insidious nature of racially motivated peremptory strikes, concluding that the stigmatization and alienation
decided in PowerslSS applied in equal force to the selection of jurors
for civil trialS. IS6 Therefore, the Court held that discriminatory peremptory challenges were prohibited in civil, as well as criminal,
cases. IS7
c.

Use by Prosecutors

In Georgia v. McCollum,ls8 the Supreme Court extended Batson
challenges even further by permitting prosecutors to demand raceneutral explanations for a criminal defendant's use of peremptory
strikes. IS9 In this case, three white defendants were charged with ag-

150.
151.
152.
153.

154.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

charged with the violation can be described as a state actor. See id. at 620 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,939-42 (1982».
See id. at 627.
See id. at 620. The peremptory challenge exercised in Edmonson was authorized
by a federal statute. See id. at 621 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994».
See id.
See id. at 622-24. The Court further noted: "[A] private party could not exercise its peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the
court. The government summons jurors, constrains their freedom of movement, and subjects them to public scrutiny and examination." [d. at 624.
See id. at 624-28. As the principal fact-finder, the jury weighs the evidence,
judges the credibility of witnesses, and renders a verdict. See id. at 625. Ultimately, the Court reasoned that the jury embodies the power of the court
and the government.
See supra notes 124-141 and accompanying text.
See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630.
See id. ("Racial discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the
proceeding is civil or criminal.").
505 U.S. 42 (1992).
See id. at 59.
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gravated assault and simple battery against two Mrican-Americans. l60
Before the jury selection phase of the trial began, the prosecution
moved to- restrain the defendants from using their peremptory challenges to discriminate against :prospective Mrican-American jurors. 161
The trial court denied the prosecutor's motion. 162
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a criminal defendant could not use peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner.163 The Court observed that the defendant's use of peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner harmed the excluded juror
as well as the community at·large. '64 Reiterating the law's need to
instill public confidence in :the courts, the Court reasoned that
criminal defendants should no more be permitted to exercise discriminatory peremptory strikes than civil litigants or prosecutors.1 65
Moreover, the Court concluded that racially motivated strikes by a
criminal defendant could be subjected to !i Batson challenge. '66 Al160. See id. at 44.
161. See id. at 4445. The prosecutor argued that defense counsel had "indicated a

clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminating manner."
[d. at 45. Given the statistical composition of the area and the likely size of
the venire, the prosecutor argued that counsel could strike all of the potential
Mrican-American jurors with the 20 peremptory strikes available to the defense. See id.
162.' See id. The trial coun held that the law does not prohibit a criminal defendant's use of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. See id.
163. Seeid. at 59 ("[T]he Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of per. emptory challenges.") .. In deciding whether the Constitution was violated, the
Coun addressed whether: (I) a criminal defendant's racially motivated strikes
causes the harms Batson was designed to protect; (2) a criminal defendant's
peremptory strikes constitutes state action; (3) a prosecutor has standing to
invoke a Batson challenge; and. (4) a criminal defendant's constitutional rights
preclude the extension of Bats'an to the defendant's strikes. See id. at 48.
164. See id. at 48-50 (addressing the harms protected by Batson). The Coun concluded that when a juror is subjected to the public indignity of racial discrimination, the juror is harmed, regardless of who exercises the peremptory challenge. See id. at 49-50. According to the Coun, the community is harmed by
the inevitable undermining of the integrity of the criminal justice system
whenever the jury selection process permits attorneys to exclude potential jurors on the basis of race. See zd.
165. See id. at 49-50.
166. See id. at 48-59. Relying on namonson, the Coun also determined that the exercise of a peremptory challenge by a criminal defendant was a result of state
action. See id. at 51-55 (discussing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991». For a discussion of Edmonson, see supra notes 142-57 and accompanying iext. Relying on Powers and Edmonson, the Coun also determined
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though the Court recognized that criminal defendants have a right
to an impartial jury, it found that this requirement did not mandate
the availability of discriminatory peremptory strikes. 167
However, the Court did observe that there was a distinction between peremptory challenges exercised to remove jurors who harbor racial prejudice and peremptory challenges exercised to remove
jurors because of their race. 168 The Court recognized that given the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury,169 a defendant has the
right to remove jurors who "would be incapable of confronting and
suppressing their racism."17o However, the Court concluded that
peremptory challenges exercised simply because the venireperson is
a particular race do not qualify under this right. 171 Indicating that
the defendant must articulate a racially neutral explanation for the
challenges if the State established a prima facie showing of a discriminatory strike, the Court remanded the case for further
proceedings. 172
2. The Court Extends Batson to Include Gender-Based Peremptory
Strikes
In 1994, the Supreme Court increased the classes of individuals protected from discriminatory peremptory strikes by holding
173

167.

168.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

that prosecutors have standing to object to the violation of the excluded juror's constitutional rights. See id. at 55-56. For a discussion of Powers, see supra
notes 124-41.
See McCoUum, 505 U.S. at 57-58 (rejecting the defendants' argument that limitations on peremptory strikes violated the attorney-client privilege, Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, and Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury). The Court noted that peremptory challenges
are not a constitutionally-protected right. See id. at 57. The peremptory challenge is "but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial
jury and a fair trial." Id. This "state-created means" may be withheld without
violating the Constitution. See id.
See id. at 59. The Court recognized that a defendant may sometimes need protection from jurors who cannot overcome their racism. See id. at 58. However,
the Court rejected the belief that "assumptions of partiality based on race
provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial juror." Id.
at 59.
For the relevant portions of this Amendment, see supra note 167.
McCoUum, 505 U.S. at 58 (citations omitted).
See id. at 59.
See id.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not extended the grounds
upon which Batson challenges may be made to all classifications requiring a
strict scrutiny analysis. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986)
(Burger, J., dissenting) (" [I]f conventional equal protection principles apply,
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that gender-based peremptory strikes also violate the Equal Protection Clause. 174 The case, fE.R. v. Alabama ex rei. T.R.,175 involved a
complaint against a male defendant for paternity and child support. 176 The State used its peremptory strikes to remove all male jurors.177 The Supreme Court concluded that gender was an unconstitutional basis for determining a juror's ability to render a fair and
impartial decision,178 holding that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for jury competence and impartiality." 179 The Court
noted that by allowing discriminatory peremptory strikes, the courts
impermissibly sent a signal to society that "certain individuals, for
no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons
could disagree."18o Comparing the historical treatment of Mrican-

174.
175.
176.
177.

178.
179.
180.

then presumably defendants could object to exclusions on the basis of not
only race, but also ... age, ... religious or political affiliation, ... mental
capacity, ... number of children, ... living arrangements, ... and employment in a particular industry, ... or profession." (citations omitted». For example, in Minnesota v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993), een. denied,
511 U.S. 1115 (1994), the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the aggravated robbery conviction of a defendant who had challenged the State's sole
peremptory strike. See Davis, 504 N.W.2d. at 768. Using the peremptory strike
against an African-American, the prosecutor explained that the removal was
due to the potential juror's beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness, not because of his
race. See id. The prosecutor argued that Jehovah's Witnesses are "reluctant to
exercise authority over their fellow human beings" as members of a jury. [d.
Refusing to overturn the defendant's conviction, the court commented that
discrimination based ()n religion was not as "common and flagrant" as that
based on race. See id. at 771. The Davis court also struggled to differentiate
between a peremptory challenge based on a venireperson's religious beliefs
and a challenge for cause based on a juror's reluctance to impose a criminal
sanction. See id. Furthermore, it is questionable whether Batson challenges
would be available on the basis of "age, occupation, education, or wealth because these are not classified as protected groups." Vyverberg, supra note 18,
at 448 (citing Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1st Cir. 1985».
SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
511 U.S. 127 (1994).
See id. at 129.
See id. The trial court rejected petitioner's theory that Batson applied to gender discrimination. See id. An all-female jury ordered him to pay child support. See id. The petitioner lost on appeal to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of
gender discrimination. See id. at 129-30.
See id. at 146.
[d. at 129.
[d. at 142. Ironically, the fE.B. Court noted that in Strauder-the groundwork
for equal protection guarantees in the courtroom-the Supreme Court "ex-
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Americans and women, the Court found no governmental interest
seryed by perpetuating a judicial system that permits discriminatory
peremptory challenges. lSI Thereafter, a Batson challenge could be
made on the exercise of a gender-based peremptory strike. IS2
IV. BATSON PROCEDURALLY

A. A Prima Facie Case
Understanding the gro\lnds on which a Batson challenge can be
· made is only one dimension to raising a challenge at trial. In order
· to properly raise a challenge, it is important for attorneys to understand how to conduct a Batson challenge procedurally. An attorney
· should be aware of when to make a Batson challenge and how to
· defend peremptory strikes against a possible objection under Batson.
Unfortunately, the Batson Court declined to adopt specific guidelines that would instruct attorneys and the lower courts as to how to
implement its decision. ls3 Due to the variety of jury selection prac. tices followed in state and federal courts, the Court decided not to
attempt to instruct those courts as to how to implement Batson s
· holding. 184
However, the Supreme Court did announce a three-prong test
for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. ls5 First, the
· defendant must be a member of a cognizable group.IS6 Second, the
defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor used peremptory
. challenges to remove members of that group from the venire. 187

181.

182.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

pressed no doubt that a State 'may confine th.e selection [of jurors] to
males.'" [d. at 131 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310
(1879». For a discussion of Strauder, see supra notes 77-87 and accompanying
text.
See fE.B., 511 U.S. at 135-39. Interestingly, however, the Court would permit
peremptory challenges that have a disproportionate impact on one gender,
absent a showing of pretext. See id. at 143 & n.16 (approving hypothetical peremptory strikes against individuals with military service and individuals employed as nurses) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991».
See id. Maryland had rejected the use of gender-based peremptory challenges
two years earlier. See Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1992). The
court of appeals concluded that gender-based peremptory challenges were
prohibited under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See id. at 270, 673 A.2d at
653.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (deferring to the trial courts'
ability to ensure that peremptory strikes are non-discriminatory).
See id. at 99-100 n.24.
See id. at 96.
See id. (citing Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1977».
See id.
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Third, the defendant must show that the facts and circumstances of
the case raise an inference that the peremptory challenges were
used to exclude that group.188 Once the defendant satisfies these
three requirements, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the peremptory strike. 189 The Batson Court's three-prong test
contemplates an attack by a criminal defendant. Nevertheless, in
light of the subsequent expansion of Batson to encompass attacks by
civil litigants and prosecutors, the test is no longer limited to criminal defendants. l90
The first two requirements for a showing of discrimination are
relatively self-evident. 191 Generally, membership within a cognizable
group and the exclusion of the group's members 'via peremptory
challenges are easily discernible. 192 As a result, the first two requirements are not subject to wide degrees of interpretation. 193 However,
it is much more difficult to discern an inference of discrimination
from the facts and circumstances of a case. Therefore, the third requirement has been subjected to a number of interpretations. 194
An inference of discriminatory intent has been drawn from various circumstances. 195 For example, courts have considered whether
the challenged juror shares membership in a cognizable group with
a defendant, victim, witness, or attorney involved in the case. 196
Courts have also considered the type and level of voir dire questioning and the juror's responses. 197 Challenges that remove all mem188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See supra notes 142-72 and accompanying text; see gmerally Christopher J. Scanlon, Casarez v. State: Texas Draws a Line in the Sand and &fuses to Extend Batson
to &ligion-Based Peremptvry Challenges, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 233 (1997) (discussing
the evolution of Batson).
191. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1105-06.
192. See id. at 1106. Courts have generally recognized that Batson applies to particular groups. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting that Hispanic persons are a cognizable group); United States v. Iron
Moccasin, 878 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1989) (identifying Native-Americans as a
cognizable group) (citing United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th
Cir. 1987»; United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 95-97 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that Italian-Americans are a cognizable group).
193. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1105-06.
194. See id. at 1106.
195. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 2.13.4, at 13-15 (listing several kinds
of evidence that demonstrate discriminatory intent).
196. See id. at 14 (citing United States v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143, 148 (4th Cir.
1989) (considering the race of the victim and witnesses».
197. See id. at 13-14.
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bers of a cognizable group have been deemed improper. 198 In addition, a prima facie showing of discrimination may even be found
where some members of a cognizable group are challenged for
cause. 199

B. The Requirement of a Neutral Basis for Challenge
1. The Batson Standard
Once an attorney establishes a prima facie case of a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the proponent of tlle challenge must
provide a neutral basis for the strike. 2OO Unfortunately, the Batson
Court failed to differentiate between the justifications that can overcome the prima facie case and what justifications are merely pretexual. 201 Facially neutral reasons for the peremptory challenge can easily be fabricated after a Batson challenge is made. 202 In the absence
of clear standards, the trial court is likely to accept almost any explanation. 203 Reasons that courts have accepted include failing to
make eye contact,204 looking flirtatiously at the defendant,205 appearing too eager to serve on a jury,206 and glancing favorably at the
other side. 207 The trial court's findings become problematic because
the appellate courts defer to their determinations and only reverse
if those determinations are "clearly erroneous. "208
198. See id. at 13 (citing United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting that all Hispanic jurors had been challenged».
199. See id.; see also United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1312 (10th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Batson was applicable to the peremptory challenge of the last
Native-American juror, even though the other challenges of Native-American
jurors had been for cause).
200. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1107.
201. See id.
202. See id. (arguing that many courts accept explanations that are "after-the-fact
rationalizations" made on "subconsciously racial grounds").
203. See id. (noting that trial court determinations are largely unreviewable because
of the history of deference to state court findings and the heightened standard for reversal).
204. See United States V. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
use of four peremptory strikes against minorities in the jury pool).
205. See id.
206. See Kelly V. Winthrow, 25 F.3d 363, 366-67 (6th Cir. 1994) (involving the peremptory strikes of seven Mrican-American jurors, two of which were stricken
because they seemed too eager to serve).
207. See Cooper v. State, 469 S.E.2d 790, 791-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (involving an
Mrican-American defendant's use of 10 peremptory strikes to remove white
jurors).
208. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1107; see also Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681,

1999]

Twelve Years Mter Batson

405

Some courts have accepted seemingly fabricated, "after-the-fact"
explanations that are potentially driven by a discriminatory purpose. 209 For example, a prosecutor's assertion that the prospective
juror had a bad attitude was deemed facially neutral, despite the
fact that the prosecutor had used seven of his fIfteen peremptory
challenges to strike Mrican-Americans. 2Io
Other courts have accepted explanations based on reasons that
correlate to race. 21l However, as announced by the Supreme Court
in Hernandez v. New York,212 a party's peremptory strikes do not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because the proffered justifIcations have a disproportionate impact on a protected class. 213
During voir dire in an attempted murder trial involving a Latino
defendant, a prosecutor struck all venirepersons with Latino surnames. 214 In response to a Batson challenge, the prosecutor argued
that the two bilingual venirepersons would not follow the interpreter's translation of testimony by Spanish-speaking witnesses.215 Although the Court noted that "disparate impact should be given appropriate weight in determining whether the prosecutor acted with
a forbidden intent, . . . it will not be conclusive in the preliminary
race-neutrality step of the Batson inquiry. "216 In regard to the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation, the Court declared: "Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. "217 The Hernandez Court

209.

210.

211.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

701, 527 A.2d 332, 342 (1987) (explaining that a "reviewing court must pay
great deference to" the trial court determinations).
Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1107-08. Arguably, judges are reluctant to implicitly
label an attorney a liar by rejecting that attorney's explanation. See Jose Felipe
Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tradgedies in the Brave New
World ofJury Sekction, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 343, 376 (1998) (discussing the ethical concerns raised by a procedure that requires a race-neutral explanation
for the exclusion of a particular juror).
See Zumbado v. State, 615 So. 2d 1223, 1232 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (explaining that the prosecutor believed that the prospective juror may have had a
"chip on her shoulder" regarding the judicial system).
See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1108 (listing reasons such as unemployment, living in high crime areas, lower education, and failure to speak the English language).
500 u.S. 352 (1991).
See id. at 361.
See id. at 355-56.
See id. at 356.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 360. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, rejected this conclusion
and asserted that "[a] n avowed justification that has a significant dispropor-

406

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 28

accorded a great deal of deference to the trial court and affirmed
the defendant's convictions.218
The weight accorded to justifications that have a disproportionate impact is no greater for peremptory strikes of African-American
jurors. For example, the peremptory strike of a female AfricanAmerican juror on the basis of her unemployment and lack of education was found to be facially neutral.219 Yet, there is a higher incidence of unemployment and lower education in minority communities. 220 As a result, this "facially neutral" reason has a
disproportionate impact on minority representation in juries. 221
2. The Purkett Standard
Perhaps the most disturbing procedural development occurred
in 1995, when the Supreme Court decided Purkett v. Elem. 222 The
Purkett decision appears to retreat from the evidentiary requirements of Batson.223 To rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination,
the Batson Court required a "neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. "224 However, the Purkett Court indicated that

218.
219.

220.

221.

222.
223.

224.

tionate impact will rarely qualifY as a legitimate, race-neutral reason sufficient
to rebut the prima facie case because disparate impact is itself evidence of discriminatory purpose." Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 364, 372.
See United States v. Ross, 872 F.2d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
government's theory that these factors indicated a "general lack of experience
on the street, instability in life, and a smaller stake in the community" were
sufficiently neutral).
See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
398 (1l7th ed. 1997). In 1996,4.7% of the white labor force was unemployed.
See id. The 1996 unemployment rates for Hispanics (8.9%) and Mrican Americans (10.5%) were significantly higher. See id. The 1996 data also shows minorities trailing in educational attainment levels. See id. at 160. For persons
over age 25, 17.2% of whites, 25.7% of Mrican-Americans, and 46.9% of Hispanics lack a high school diploma. See id.
.
See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1108; see also Pittard, supra note 46, at 999 (discussing the constitutionality of partially race-based peremptory strikes in a hypothetical medical malpractice case in which a doctor misdiagnosed a case of
sickle-cell anemia).
514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
See id. at 770 (Stevens, j., dissenting) (arguing that the second step of the
three-step process articulated in Batson has been lessened from a specific, neutral explanation to use of an incredible explanation or a mere denial of an
improper motive).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). The Purkett Court argued that this
passage did nothing more than prevent the challenged attorney from "satisfy[ing] his burden of production by merely denying that he had a discrimi-
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this "neutral explanation" did not have to be persuasive or
plausible. 225
The facts of Purkett illustrate the danger inherent in this lowered standard. In this case, the defendant was on trial for seconddegree robbery.226 The prosecutor argued that an African-American
juror's long hair and facial hair rendered him an unfit juror. 227 •
Rather than asking whether the given justification was plausible, the
Court emphasized that the trial court must first concentrate on
whether the justification was facially race-neutral.228 Therefore, the
prosecutor's strike was upheld because a member of any race may
grow long hair, a beard, or a mustache.229 Such reasoning could
render future Batson challenges useless.230 However, the ultimate impact of Purkett will depend upon whether state courts choose to follow its standard.
For example, in People v. jamison,231 the California Court of Appeals refused to follow Purkett, invoking the protections of the state
constitution. 232 In jamison, the defendants were African-Americans,
and the prosecutor excluded the only African-American juror with a
peremptory challenge. 233 The only explanation offered by the State
was the juror's purported avoidance of eye contact with the prosecutor. 234 The jamison court declared that without more, the trial court
natory intent or merely by affirming his good faith." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769.
225. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. The Purkett Court indicates that a neutral reason
that is "silly or superstitious" does not end a Batson inquiry. See id. If the proponent of the challenge gives any neutral reason for the challenge, the judge
must proceed to the next step in the Batson inquiry, which is to determine
whether or not there has been purposeful discrimination. See id. at 767. At
that point, but not before, the persuasiveness of the reason becomes relevant.
See id. at 768.
226. See id. at 766.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 769.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that without further evidence,
"some implausible, fantastic, and silly explanations" could overcome Batson
challenges).
231. 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
232. See id. at 686.
233. See id. at 682.
234. See id. The prosecutor believed that the juror's behavior indicated an unwillingness to serve on the jury and that she was disinterested in the events in
the courtroom. See id. The State also attempted to argue that she exercised
her peremptory strike because the venireperson had no prior jury experience.
See id. at 683. The trial court rejected this justification, commenting that other
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could not uphold the prosecutor's use of the peremptory strike.235
The court referred to Purkett as a "digression from prior federal law
prohibiting" discriminatory peremptory challenges. 236 The court
concluded that California's constitution and prior case law required
its trial courts to demand a "race neutral, reasonably specific, and
trial related" explanation. 237
When the proponent of a Batson challenge must rely upon the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution,
state courts may likewise chip away at Batson. For example, the Nevada Supreme Court accepted Purkett's lead in Washington v. State. 238
At trial, the court denied a Batson challenge to the prosecutor's use
of a peremptory strike to remove the only Mrican-American male in
the venire. 239 Adhering to Purkett, the Washington court indicated
that a court did not have to require a persuasive or plausible explanation. 24O The court concluded that there was no discriminatory intent in the prosecutor's strike on the basis of the prospective juror's
job, education, or lack of children. 241 Therefore, the court affirmed
the trial judge's ruling. 242
C. Remedies for a Batson Violation

Once identifying a Batson violation, the trial court must then
implement an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court mentioned
two possible remedies for a Batson violation established before the
trial begins. 243 However, while the trial court must carefully apply either solution, each has its individual benefits and pitfalls.
As suggested by the Batson Court, one remedy is to call for a
new jury venire. 244 Once a party removes a venireperson for discriminatory reasons, the representative panel is destroyed. 245 To this end,
members of the venire also likely lacked experience as jurors. See id.
235. See id. at 686.
236. See id.
237. [d. (refusing to follow the Purkett majority because California law, not federal
law, controlled the disposition of the case).
238. 922 P.2d 547 (Nev. 1996).
239. See id. at 549.
240. See id. (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 u.s. 765, 768-69 (1995».
241. See id.
242. See id. (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the
objection to the peremptory challenge).
243. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 u.s. 79, 99-100 n.24 (1986).
244. See id. at 99-100 n.24.
245. See Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1220 ("[TJhe venire is no longer representative of the community after minority jurors have been stricken.").
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some view calling for a new venire as a necessary remedy.246 A number of jurisdictions require this solution. 247 Jurisdictions that require
this remedy usually focus on the impartial jury and fair cross-section
principles rather than the rights of the excluded juror. 248
Unfortunately, rather than dissuading parties from using peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, the possibility of a
new jury venire may act as an incentive for using peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. Sometimes the attorney does not
like the venire as a whole and may prefer a new jury venire. 249
Therefore, with a few improper strikes, the attorney could effectively get rid of the entire venire. 250
A second remedy suggested by the Batson Court is to reinstate
improperly excluded jurors. 251 This remedy has also been adopted
by several states. 252 Under an equal protection analysis, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates both the defendant's
and excluded juror's constitutional rights. 253 The defendant's equal
protection rights are violated by the exclusion of potential jurors
who are members of the same cognizable group as the defendant.254
246. See id.
247. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 765 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the venire must be dismissed after a Batson violation and the jury selection process
will begin over again with a different venire); Minniefield v. State, 539 N.E.2d
464, 466 (Ind. 1989) (finding error where the trial court failed to grant a mistrial after the prosecutor failed to give a racially neutral explanation for striking potential jurors); State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 159 (N.C. 1993)
(concluding that the selection of a new jury is the remedy for a Batson violation).
248. See Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1220-21.
249. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 178 (1989).
250. See id. (opining that a prosecutor in violation of Batson would gain a victory
for his unlawful jury selection tactics).
251. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99-100 n.24 (1986) (citing United States v.
Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 474 (Conn. 1976».
252. See, e.g., Ellerbee v. State, 450 S.E.2d 443, 448 (Ga. 1994) (holding that a trial
court has the power to seat a juror determined to have been challenged in violation of Batson); Conerly v. State, 544 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1989) (concluding that where there is no racially neutral reason for a strike, the trial
court must seat the juror); State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 416 (Mo. 1993)
(" [T]he prop~r remedy for discriminatory use of peremptory strikes is to
quash the strikes and permit those members of the venire stricken for discriminatory reasons to sit on the jury if they otherwise would.").
253. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87 (discussing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880».
254. See id. at 86.
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The equal· protection· rights of the excluded juror are violated because each juror has the right to participate in jury service, regardless of race or other group membership.255 Reinstatement of the excluded juror corrects the violation of the defendant's and excluded
juror's equal protection rights by reversing the peremptory challenge. Therefore, reinstatement of the excluded juror appears to be
the required remedy under an equal protection analysis. 256
Furthermore, the potential reinstatement of an excluded juror
is a strong incentive for avoiding discriminatory challenges because
the jury may no longer be impartial once an excluded juror has
been reseated. Therefore, an attorney who knows that an improperly challenged juror may be reseated will pay more attention to his
or her peremptory challenges. 257 Reinstatement would encourage attorneys to examine their conscious and unconscious motives for discrimination before making a peremptory challenge against a member of a cognizable groUp.258
Notwithstanding the potential benefits, there is a disadvantage
to the reinstatement of an excluded juror. The reseated juror may
suspect that the challenge was discriminatory and harbor hostility
against both the attorney who made the challenge and that attorney's c1ient. 259 The potential for destroying the impartiality of the
jury as a whole limits the effectiveness of this remedy.
Weighing both the positive and the negative aspects of each
remedy, the trial court is ultimately in the best position to determine which remedy is most .appropriate to the case at hand. 260 One
commentator suggests that no matter what remedy the trial court
chooses for a Batson violation, its solution should further two
goals. 261 First, the remedy should persuade attorneys not to make
discriminatory challenges. 262 Second, the remedy should punish the
attorney who chooses to make an improper challenge. 263 No matter
255. See id. at 87 ("A person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.' ~
(quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)(Fr,mkfurter, J., dissenting»).
256. See Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1221.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See sU/ffa note 208 and accompanying text.
261. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1116-17, 1122-23 (discussing a number of proposed remedies for Balson violations).
262. See id. at 1116-17.
263. See id. at 1113-23.
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which solution is pursued, appellate courts will afford trial courts
great deference. 264
V. BATSON IN MARYLAND

A. System for Exercising Peremptory Challenges
As in most jurisdictions, the system for exercisin:g peremptory
challenges in Maryland is governed by rule and statute. 265 Mter voir
dire, the court identifies potential jurors who have qualified to be
seated on the jury. The attorneys for each side are then allowed to
exercise a statutorily defined number of peremptory challenges. 266
The number of available peremptory strikes varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Most state courts provide parties with six peremptory strikes in both civil and criminal cases. 267 Federal courts allow three peremptory challenges. 268 In Maryland, each civil party
may exercise four peremptory challenges, plus one additional challenge for each group of three or less alternate venirepersons. 269 For
purposes of determining the maximum number of peremptory
strikes, multiple plaintiffs or defendants will be viewed as a single
party, unless otherwise directed by the court. 270
The peremptory challenges permitted in Maryland criminal
cases vary with the severity of the possible sentence. 271 For example,
the defendant who may be subject to the death penalty may exercise twenty peremptory challenges, whereas the State is granted a
total of ten. 272 In cases where a defendant faces a sentence of twenty
years of imprisonment or greater, there are ten peremptory challenges at the disposal of defense counsel and five strikes available to
the State. 273 For sentences of less than twenty years, the defendant
and the State are each permitted a maximum of four peremptory
challenges. 274
264. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
265. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991) ("Today in
most jurisdictions, statutes or rules make a limited number of peremptory
challenges available to parties in both civil and criminal proceedings.").
266. See MD. R Cw. P. 2-512(h); see also MD. R CRIM. P. 4-313.
267. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 67.
268. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1998).
269. See MD. R Cw. P. 2-512(h).
270. See id.
271. See MD. CODE ANN .. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 8-301 (1998).
272. See id. § 8-301(a).
273. See id. § 8-301 (b). However, this provision does not apply to common law offenses for which no specific remedy is' statutorily provided. See id.
274. See id. § 8-301(c).
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B. The Prima Facie Case
Like other jurisdictions, Maryland has grappled with the problem of implementing the mandate of the Batson Court.275 Thus, Maryland courts rendered several important decisions that helped to
establish guidelines for exercising and responding to Batson challenges. 276 Essentially, the issues of establishing that a party is a member of a cognizable group and whether that group has been the focus of peremptory challenges seem to be relatively straightforward
concepts. 277 Yet, like other jurisdictions, Maryland courts have repeatedly revisited the issue of what constitutes a cognizable group.
In Mejia v. State,278 a criminal defendant on trial for the rape of
a white woman alleged that the State struck the only potential juror
identified as Hispanic in violation of Batson. 279 Concluding that the
defendant had established a prima facie case,280 the Court of Appeals of Maryland set forth the criteria for determining when a person is a member of a cognizable groUp.28I The court noted that visual observations are ordinarily acceptable as a basis for determining
that a person is a member of a cognizable groUp.282 However, group
275. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 469 S.E.2d 790 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Brashear v. State,
90 Md. 709, 715, 603 A.2d 901, 903 (1992); Cudjoe v. Commonwealth, 475
S.E.2d 821 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
276. See Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992) (holding that a prima facie case showing of fact for Batson purposes was established by the defendant's
proffer that the stricken venireperson was the only Hispanic in the venire);
Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988) (concluding that a prima
facie case for discrimination had been established by the fact that the prosecutor had stricken the sole Mrican-American from the jury venire).
277. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
278. 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992).
279. See id. at 527-28, 616 A.2d at 358-59.
280. See id. at 539, 616 A.2d at 358.
281. See id. at 535 n.8, 616 A.2d at 363 n.8 (explaining that the basis for concluding
whether a person is a member of a particular ethnic or racial group should
be established in detail in the record). The court did not address the question of whether Hispanics constituted a cognizable group because of the Supreme Court's recognition of this class in Hernandez. v. New Yom. For a discussion of Hernandez, see supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
282. See Mejia, 328 Md. at 535, 616 A.2d at 362. The court noted that once a party
suggests that a venireperson is a member of a cognizable group, it is the responsibility of the other party to object if this assertion is incorrect. See id. at
537, 616 A.2d at 363 (likening silence to a tacit admission). The court of special appeals had concluded that affirmative evidence, not an unchallenged
statement, was required to establish each element of a prima facie case. See id.
at 532, 616 A.2d at 361.
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membership could also be based on non-visual observations, such as
surnames and language. 283 The excluded juror in Mejia had a Spanish surname and spoke Spanish. 284 Therefore, according to the
court of appeals, the defendant had established that the excluded
juror was a member of a cognizable groUp.285 Moreover, the court
determined that the effect of the exclusion of that juror was the
elimination of all Hispanics from the jury.286 Therefore, the court of
appeals concluded that the case should be remanded to give the
prosecutor an opportunity to provide a facially neutral explanation
for the strike. 287
The party making a Batson challenge has the burden of convincing the trial court that intentional discrimination has occurred. 288 In Stanley v. State,289 the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined the facts and circumstances that would generate a prima
facie showing of discrimination. 290 The Stanley court considered two
cases involving African-American criminal defendants-Clarence
Trice and Michael Stanley.291 Each defendant had been convicted by
a jury that was substantially or totally composed of white jurors. 292 In
both cases, prosecutors used peremptory challenges to exclude most
or all African-Americans from the pool of prospective jurors. 293
In the trial of Trice, the jury convicted the defendant of burglary, malicious destruction of property, and theft.294 There was only
one African-American in the array of prospective jurors. 295 The State
used one of its peremptory challenges to eliminate that potential ju283. See id. at 535, 616 A2d at 362.
284. See id. at 52~27, 616 A.2d at 358.
285. See id. at 539, 616 A2d at 364 (observing that there was no expressed disagreement with the proffer that the stricken venireperson was the only Hispanic in
the jury venire).
286. See id.
287. See id. at 540-41, 616 A.2d at 365. At trial, the judge denied the defendant's
Batson motion without asking for a neutral basis for the challenge from the
State. See id.
288. See Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 61, 542 A.2d 1267, 1272 (1988)
(" [E]xamination of Batson and the Title VII cases has convinced us that the
defendant has the ultimate burden of persuading the court there has been intentional racial discrimination.").
289. 313 Md. 50, 542 A2d 1267 (1988).
290. See id. at 71-72, 542 A2d at 1277.
291. See id. at 54, 542 A.2d at 1278.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 72, 81-82, 542 A2d at 1278, 1282.
294. See id. at 81, 542 A2d at 1282.
295. See id.
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ror.296 The court of appeals held that when the State uses a peremptory strike in a manner which insures that no Mrican-American jurors will serve in a case involving an Mrican-American defendant, a
prima facie case has been made under Batson. 297
In the trial of Stanley, the jury convicted the defendant of several offenses, including murder, and sentenced him to a period of
incarceration. 298 The State used eighty percent of its peremptory
challenges to remove Mrican-Americans from the pool of prospective jurors,299 even though Mrican-Americans constituted less than
twenty-five percent of the venire. 300 The court of appeals held that
there was a "legally mandatory rebuttable presumption" of discrimination in Stanley's case because the circumstances indicated that
the State had disproportionately used peremptory challenges against
a specific group. 30\ The case involved an Mrican-American defendant, victim, and key State witnesses. 302 In addition, none of the voir
dire responses made the excluded Mrican-American jurors ripe for
a prosecutorial challenge. 303 It appears that unless circumstances in296. See iii. at 82-83, 542 A.2d at 1282.
297. See id. at 87, 542 A.2d at 1285.
298. See id. at 64, 542 A.2d at 1273. Throughout the trial, the State pursued a death
sentence for the defendant. See iii. at 64, 542 A.2d at 1273-74.
299. See id. at 72, 542 A.2d at 1278.
300. See id. at 73, 542 A.2d at 1278. The jury that convicted the defendant included
three African-Americans, or 25% of the jury. See iii. at 66-67,542 A.2d at 1275.
301. Id. at 73, 542 A.2d at 1278. At trial, the prosecutor also argued that the
defendant had not timely objected to the peremptory strikes by waiting to
raise his Batson challenge until after the jury had been selected, but before it
had been sworn. See id. at 68, 542 A.2d at 1276. Although the State conceded
that the defendant had preserved the issue for appeal by objecting in a timely
manner, the court nonetheless discussed the appropriate timing for a Batson
challenge. See id. at 69-70, 542 A.2d at 1276. The court explained:
A Batson objection is timely if the defendant makes it no later than
when the last juror has been seated and before the jury has been
sworn. By waiting, rather than objecting to the first and every subsequent strike of a black juror, a clearer picture of what the State is doing may be seen; a pattern may form.
Id. at 69, 542 A.2d at 1276. However, the court did note that if there is a question as to the stricken venire person's membership in a cognizable group or if
there is a possibility that stricken venire persons will not be available once dismissed, the better practice may be to bring the matter to the court's attention
at an earlier time. See id. at 69 n.lO, 542 A.2d at 1276 n.lO.
302. See id. at 73, 542 A.2d at 1278. The police officers and the other witnesses involved were all white. See id.
303. See id. Only two of the African-American venire persons against which the
State exercised peremptory challenges indicated any response to the court's
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dicate otherwise, the use of a highly skewed number of peremptory
challenges against a cognizable group creates a presumption of discriminatory intent. 304 Therefore, the proponent of the challenges
will have to rebut this presumption with a neutral explanation. 305
C.

Neutral Basis 1m- Challenge

Once the Stanley court determined that the defendants had established a prima facie case, it remanded the cases and ordered the
trial courts to conduct a hearing at which the State would be given
an opportunity to explain its peremptory challenges. 306 As mandated
by Batson, once a prima facie case is made, the opposing counsel
must provide a neutral explanation for the strikes. 307 Although the
explanation does not have to be equal to a challenge for cause, it
must be more thana good faith denial of discrimination 30R or an assertion that the excluded juror would have been biased. 309 The
court had explicitly provided that the defendants be given an opportunity to "rebut" these justifications, so as to expose any pretextual explanations. 310
During the hearing for the defendant Stanley, the trial court
ruled that there was a race-neutral basis for the State's peremptory
strikes;311 the court of special appeals heard the appeal from this
ruling. 312 The appeal is significant because the court of special appeals discusses the types of evidence that may be used to reb,:!t a
presumption of discrimination. 313
According to the court of special appeals;\~butting a presumption of discrimination requires proof of acceptable criteria for making the challenge. 314 The court recognized that age, occupation, and

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

310.
311.
312.

313.
314.

preliminary questions. See id. In contrast, the State used peremptory challenges against two white venire persons that had expressed reservations about
imposing a death sentence during the court's questioning. See id.
S(,R id.
See id. at 75, 542A.2d at 1279.
See Stanley v. State, 85 Md. App. 92, 96-97, 582 A.2d 532, 534 (1990).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
See id. at 97-98.
See id. ("[T]he prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of
discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's
race on the assumption . . . that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.").
See Stanley, 313 Md. at 80 n.16, 88, 542 A.2d at 1281 n.16, 1286.
.Ye Stanley v. State, 85 Md. App. 92, 95, 582 A.2d 532, 533 (1990).
See id.
SrR id. at 105, 582 A.2d at 538; see also supra notes 200-205.
S(,R Stanley, 85 Md. App. at 101, \05,582 A.2d at 536, 538.
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demeanor were acceptable criteria. 315 Such criteria must be established by evidence from the jury selection process. 316 Therefore, the
attorney facing a Batson challenge must be able to reconstruct the
circumstances of the jury selection process. 3I7
The ability to reconstruct the circumstances of the jury selection process becomes critical, and challenging, when the Batson inquiry is made after a lengthy trial, on appeal, or both. Memories
fade with the passage of time, making it more difficult to accurately
recall the events of jury selection. 3I8 Therefore, the trial court
should ordinarily conduct a Batson inquiry at the time the Batson
challenge is made. 319 However, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has held that a Batson inquiry is not per se unreliable merely
because it is conducted after the trial is over. 320 As long as parties
have the ability to reconstruct the circumstances of jury selection to
the satisfaction of the trial court, a post-trial Batson inquiry will not
be automatic grounds for reversaJ.321
There are a number of steps that an attorney can take to successfully reconstruct the basis for a peremptory challenge. For example, attorneys should take notes on the lists of potential jurors
provided by the court during voir dire.322 Attorneys should also create their own lists and make additional notes regarding the jurors
they intend to strike. 323 These lists and notations will enable attorneys to prove that their peremptory challenges were based on neutral reasons. 324
D. Remedy after Showing a Batson Violation

Maryland examined the appropriate remedies for Batson viola315.
316.
317.
318.

319.
320.

See id. at 101-06, 582 A.2d at 536-38.
See id. at 100, 582 A.2d at 535.
See id. at 97-100, 582 A.2d at 534-35. .
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 u.s. 79, 133 n.12 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting)
(" [I] t would be virtually impossible for the prosecutor in this case to recall
why he used his peremptory challenges in the fashion he did."); see also Ford
Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 28, 703 A.2d 1315, 1328 (1998) (involving
a defendant who argued that after a four-week trial, "memories were not as
fresh").
See Ford Motor Co., 119 Md. App. at 28, 703 A.2d at 1328.
See id. at 29, 703 A.2d at 1328. This holding is grounded in the fact that Maryland courts have "remanded cases to trial courts for Batson hearings long after
the jury selections and trials in such cases." [d.
See id.
See Stanley, 85 Md. App. at 99-100, 582 A.2d at 535.

321.
322.
323. See id.
324. See id.
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tions in Jones v. State. 325 Here, the court of appeals expressly recognized that the remedy for Batson violations was an issue that the Batson Court had left unresolved. 326 Agreeing with the court of special
appeals, the Jones court held that the determination of the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation lies with the trial court.327 According to Jones, the trial court haS discretion to fashion a remedy that
addresses and resolves the specific harm. 328
In Jones, the trial court found that the defense attorney's peremptory challenges of five white venirepersons were discriminatory.329 Upon inquiry, the court concluded that the defense counsel's explanations were "pure, simple subterfuge."33o To remedy the
violation, the trial court reseated the seven stricken jurors. 33l On appeal, the defendant argued that instead of res eating the stricken jurors, the trial court should have dismissed the entire panel and
started the selection process over again with a new venire.332 In response, the State argued that reseating improperly stricken jurors
should be the sole remedy for Batson violations. 333 Adopting the
method used by the majority of state courts, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland delegated the determination of the appropriate remedy
to the trial court. 334
In its analysis, the court indicated that after a Batson violation is
established, the goal of the trial court should be to effectuate a
remedy that will balance the equal protection rights of the litigants
and the challenged juror. 335 The court stated that although there is
no specific remedy, the facts and circumstances of each particular
325. 343 Md. 584, 683 A.2d 520 (1996).
326. See id. at 586, 683 A.2d at 521.
327. See id. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529. The court of appeals observed that a Batson
violation may be "remedied by the discharge of the entire venire and beginning jury selection anew with a new venire or by the reseating of the improperly stricken juror." Id. at 594, 683 A.2d at 525.
328. See id. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529.
329. See id. at 588-89, 683 A.2d at 522.
330. Id. at 588, 683 A.2d at 522.
331. See id. at 589, 683 A.2d at 522. The trial court recalled not only the five white
jurors who had been improperly stricken, but two jurors who had been properly stricken by the prosecution. See id.
332. See id. at 591, 683 A.2d at 523 (noting that the petitioner argued that reseated
jurors were "biased against him for having attempted to remove them from
the venire, [and that] reseating the jurors significantly prejudiced him, in violation of his [Fifth] Amendment right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury").
333. See id. at 591-92, 683 A.2d at 524.
334. See id. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529.
335. See id. at 599, 683 A.2d at 527.
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case are important considerations in fashioning a remedy.336 Therefore, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate these considerations and choose a remedy that balances the rights of all parties
concerned. 337 Although the court of appeals limited its discussion to
the remedies of reseating the excluded juror or impaneling a new
venire,338 Jones does not appear to limit a trial court's ability to formulate a creative remedy.339
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court in Jones
made the appropriate decision because the Batson inquiry was not
conducted in the presence of the jury.340 However, where the circumstances show that the reseated juror will harbor prejudice
against the side that impermissibly exercised the peremptory strike,
the court held that the only "viable effective remedy" is the dismissal of the entire venire. 341 To do otherwise would be an abuse of the
trial court's discretion. 342

VI. ANALYSIS
Practically speaking, an attorney must always be prepared to
challenge the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by opposing counsel. In addition, attorneys must also be prepared to defend their peremptory challenges in the face of charges that they
were exercised in a discriminatory manner. To be effective, an attorney should be prepared to present the court with all of the circumstances surrounding the acceptance or rejection of each individual
juror.
Consequently, the attorney should take meticulous notes during the jury selection process. These notes should include information regarding the characteristics of the jury pool by identifying
males, females, and minorities. The attorney's notes should also re336. SI'£ id. at 602, 683 A.2d at 529. Factors to be considered include a defendant's
constitutional right to a non-discriminatory jury and a juror's right not to be
excluded because of race. See id.
337. See id.
338. SI'£ id. at 601, 683 A.2d at 528.
339. See id. at 602, 683 A.2d at 529 (finding that conflicting constitutional rights between the defendant and the excluded juror "militates in favor of permitting
the trial court to tailor the remedy so as to protect the rights of all parties
concerned").
340. See id. at 603, 683 A.2d at 529 (noting that there was nothing in the record to
suggest that the jurors were aware of the basis of their exclusion, or that it
was unconstitutional).
341. [d. at 604-05, 683 A.2d at 530.
342. See id.
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flect each juror's response to the voir dire questions. The attorney
should also maintain a record of each juror stricken, the factors relating to the strike, and a record for each juror remaining in the
pool.
Theoretically, an attorney familiar with the various cases interpreting Batson will be prepared to take the appropriate action when
challenging or defending a peremptory strike. However, twelve years
after the Batson decision, attorneys and courts are still struggling to
understand when and how a Batson challenge should be made. No
clear-cut or bright-line rules have evolved from Batson or its progeny. To determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination has
been established and whether a facially neutral reason for the challenge has been provided, courts must weigh the particular circumstances of each case. 343 However, circumstances and individual
judges can vary widely from one case to another. Thus, it is virtually
impossible to determine the outcome of any given Batson challenge.
Despite the confusion, many commentators recognize the need
to prohibit the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. 344 However, views as to how to resolve the confusion vary. One proposal involves the use of affirmative peremptory choices as opposed to peremptory strikes. 345 Rather than excluding jurors, affirmative
peremptory choices would be used to include particular jurors. 346
Such choices could be race-based. 347 However, this proposal seems
counterproductive if the goal is to eliminate race and gender criteria from the jury selection process. Others advocate the total elimination of peremptory challenges. 348 In the absence of peremptory

343. See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
345. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1114 (describing a proposal by Professor
Deborah Ramirez to use affirmative peremptory choices to increase the odds
of securing minority representation on a jury); see also Anderson, supra note
209, at 392 (proposing an "affirmative selection" procedure in which defendants trade some of their peremptory challenges for jurors that they believe
will be favorable).
346. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1114. The affirmative choices would be made
after all challenges for cause had been exercised. See id.
347. See id.
348. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, j., concurring). As
noted by Justice Marshall: "The decision today will not end the racial discrimi~
nation that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can
be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely." [d. at
102-03 (Marshall, j., concurring).
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challenges, the trial court would have to validate every challenge. 349
Arguably, this would allow a judge to seat a juror that is objectionable to both parties. 350 However, if an expanded challenge for cause
system is adopted 351 and properly administered, the parties could
exclude any juror where there is good reason for the exclusion.352
Other proposals offered by legal scholars address the need for
deterrents against discriminatory peremptory challenges. 353 These
proposals include application of an exclusionary rule when the
prosecutor uses a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner354 and implementation of ethical rules to sanction practitioners
using peremptories discriminatorily.355 While the need to deter discrimination is valid, sanctions are worthless if discrimination cannot
be proven to the satisfaction of the judge. In Batson, Justice Marshall expressed his concern regarding the difficulties associated with
establishing a prima facie case and determining prosecutorial motives. 356 These difficulties remain despite the countless attempts by
state and federal courts to interpret and apply Batson standards.
However, courts could adopt rules that describe the specific
types of nondiscriminatory reasons that will survive a Batson challenge. 357 Statutory limitations on acceptable explanations could also
349. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1134 (indicating that a judge's "willingness to
give defense lawyers greater latitude in using for-cause strikes" would be crucial to protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial). If there were no peremptory challenges, the means to eliminate undesirable jurors would be primarily
limited to challenges for cause. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
350. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1140.
351. See id. at 1134 (suggesting the adoption of an "expanded for cause" system in
which the trial judge could accept challenges on any basis that would lead a
reasonable attorney to believe that the potential juror could not be impartial) .
352. See id. at 1140.
353. See id. at 1116-23 (discussing proposed disincentives and penalties for discrimination in the jury selection process).
354. See id. at 1117 (proposing that criminal proceedings be dismissed with
prejudice if a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion).
355. See id. at 1116-17.
356. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 1O.s.D6 (1986) (acknowledging that the use
of discriminatory challenges must be "flagrant" to establish a prima facie case,
and explaining that a prosecutor's motives may be hidden behind facially neutral reasons and unconscioUs racism).
357. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1124. Several court-imposed rules have been
proposed. According to one commentator, courts should reject reasons like
demeanor and intuitive impressions, require that all explanations be based on
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be adopted. 358 Arguably, the wide variety of potential circumstances
suggests an almost infinite set of rules or limitations. Unless the
rules or limitations address every conceivable explanation, some
valid explanations could be rejected. Yet, it is possible to develop
standards that would balance the types of acceptable reasons with
guidelines for determining purely pretextual rationalizations. Thus,
the appropriate standards must provide the trial judge with the necessary tools for evaluating Batson challenges without totally eliminating the trial judge's discretion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many' would hail Batson as a pivotal decision that helped to
eradicate discrimination from the jury selection process. 359 Mter Batson, an attorney could no longer exclude jurors of identifiable classes or groups without challenge. 360 However, with the evolution of
Batson, the peremptory challenge has become less discretionary.
Some bemoan this weakening of the peremptory challenge, arguing
that there is insufficient time and freedom for attorneys to question
potential jurors or transcend superficial groupings and claSsifications. 361 Even when an attorney is allowed to conduct extensive voir
dire, the resulting information is often insufficient for the attorney
to make more than an intuitive decision. 362
Unfortunately, these intuitive decisions have often resulted in
discriminatory practices. 363 There is a tendency to rely on negative
stereotypes unless they are dispelled by body language or a verbal
exchange. 364 The cost of relying on negative stereotypes is discrimi-

358.
359.

360.
361.

362.
363.
364.

the juror's voir dire statements or responses to a questionnaire, and require
attorneys to strike all jurors that share some undesirable characteristic. See id.
See id.
See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1101 (maintaining that Batson reduced the burden of proof that a defendant needed to establish a discriminatory use of a
peremptory challenge); Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1195 (noting that
prior to Batson, a defendant had to demonstrate a systematic pattern of excluding jurors because of race).
See HAYDOCK & SoNSfENG, supra note 4, § 1.35, at 24-25.
See Bill K. Felty, Resting in Mid-Air, the Supreme Court Strikes the Traditional Peremptury Challenge and Creates a New Creature, the Challenge fur Semi-Cause: Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 27 TULSA LJ. 203, 221 (1991) (concluding that if
more time were allowed for attorneys to question potential jurors up front,
the likelihood of error and appeal would ultimately be reduced).
See id. at 222-23 (noting that even with intensive questioning, a negative stereotype may nonetheless be the basis for a peremptory challenge).
See id.; see also supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
See Felty, supra note 361, at 223; see also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying
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nation in the use of peremptory challenges. 365
The Supreme Court has determined that this cost is too high. 366
The courtroom is not the appropriate place for stereotypes and discrimination. When a jury is chosen by discriminatory means, criminal defendants and civil litigants will find it difficult to accept its
verdict because they lose confidence in the system's ability to render
"color-blind" justice. 367
Batson may also be viewed as a single step toward the total elimination of peremptory challenges. 368 In Batson, the Supreme Court
gave us the goal of eliminating peremptory challenges based on stereotypes associated with cognizable groups.369 However, the Supreme Court did not tell us how to achieve that goaJ.370 Subsequent
decisions rendered by state and federal courts37I have added structure to the foundation laid by Strauder3 72 and Batson. 373 Unfortunately, these decisions have yet to create a stable structure upon
which an attorney can formulate or defend against a Batson
challenge. 374
The ultimate goal is to establish a fair and impartial judicial system. A clear mandate against discrimination in the courtroom must
be a fundamental part of that system. Skin color and gender cannot
be determinants in the jury selection process. Attorneys must find
other means to ensure jury impartiality.375 Therefore, we will continue to struggle with Batson until our goal is reached.
Cheryl A. C. Brown

text.
365. See Felty, supra note 361, at 223 (explaining that if voir dire works as it should,
venirepersons' answers to questioning should uncover potential bias).
366. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (finding that racial discrimination
casts a shadow on the entire judicial process).
367. See id. at 412.
368. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
369. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
370. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 202-16, 22242 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
375. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (maintaining that a prospective juror's bias should be explored not on the basis of ancestry or skin color, but rather through questions that attempt to uncover the
bias at issue).

